{"id":18835,"date":"2015-12-17T08:46:18","date_gmt":"2015-12-17T08:46:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/2015\/12\/aland-s-demilitarisation-and-neutralisation-at-the-cold-war-s-end-1988-1995\/"},"modified":"2015-12-17T08:46:18","modified_gmt":"2015-12-17T08:46:18","slug":"aland-s-demilitarisation-and-neutralisation-at-the-cold-war-s-end-1988-1995","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/aland-s-demilitarisation-and-neutralisation-at-the-cold-war-s-end-1988-1995\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00c5land\u2019s demilitarisation and neutralisation at the end of the Cold War, 1988\u20131995"},"content":{"rendered":"<table style=\"width: 100px;\" border=\"1\" frame=\"void\" cellspacing=\"3\" cellpadding=\"3\" align=\"right\">\n<caption>\u00a0<\/caption>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><img decoding=\"async\" class=\" size-full wp-image-18800\" src=\"https:\/\/peace.ax\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/10\/Yannick_Poullie.jpg\" alt=\"Yannick Poullie\" width=\"150\" height=\"188\" \/><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\"><em><em>Yannick Poullie is a junior researcher in the research project \u201dDemilitarisation in an increasingly militarized world. International perspectives in a multilevel framework \u2013 the case of the \u00c5land Islands\u201d, funded by the KONE foundation. He holds a master\u2019s degree in \u201cPeace, Mediation and Conflict Research\u201d from the University of Tampere, Finland. Prior to that he studied at the University of D\u00fcsseldorf and the University of Turku, respectively.<\/em><\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><em>Mariehamn, December 2015<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Today, \u00c5land\u2019s status as a demilitarised and neutralised territory is well-established in international customary law. One important contributing factor for that is the activity of the people and politicians of \u00c5land beginning in the 1980s. Against de iure provisions, the \u00c5land autonomy managed to establish itself as an internationally relevant de facto actor on the issue of its international legal status. Finnish policy-makers were not vocal \u2013 as they would have preferred to avoid both the issue and its discussion \u2013 but unmistakable in their support for the maintenance of \u00c5land\u2019s status, as were those of Finland\u2019s neighbours. In light of this fact, preferences by the Finnish military to re-examine this status and possibly remilitarise the \u00c5land region need to be seen as a verbal \u2018show of force\u2019 amidst uncertain shifts in the post-Cold War Baltic Sea region rather than as a realistic possibility. These findings are of relevance still today since the demilitarisation and neutralisation has occasionally been discussed in relation to recent concerns over a possible destabilisation of the Baltic Sea region.<\/p>\n<p>The region of \u00c5land enjoys far-reaching autonomy within the Republic of Finland and has been both demilitarised and neutralised for almost a century, while its demilitarisation has been in force since 1856. During the past four months, being a guest researcher at The \u00c5land Islands Peace Institute, I have looked at parliamentary debates on \u00c5land\u2019s demilitarisation and neutralisation in both \u00c5land and Finland. I focused on a period of great shifts in the Baltic region, the years around the Cold War\u2019s end, roughly 1988\u20131995. The following blog entry is based on the scientific article I have produced during my stay at the institute, currently in the peer-review process of an international journal.<\/p>\n<p>Although being situated at the border between the two power blocs of the Cold War, the Baltic region had enjoyed relative stability for decades during the East-West conflict. When socialist governments began to fall in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the future was left unclear. How would the former Soviet Union develop? Would it become a peaceful democracy or would aggressive nationalism win over? Would a new stability emerge or would new divides be created?<\/p>\n<p>The Finnish government and parliament were determined to continue following their concept of the preceding decades: Finland would stay clear of military alliances such as NATO and keep a credible potential to defend itself independently against any aggressor. At the same time it would vocally support multilateral organisations like the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE as encompassing forums \u2013 especially encompassing Russia \u2013 for maintaining security and stability not only around the Baltic Sea but in the world at large. Finland was well aware of the dangers for stability of a Western military alliance advancing towards the Russian border, despite promises to act in dialogue with the former superpower.<\/p>\n<p>While Finland thus chose not to join the alliance, and so did Sweden, other littoral states of the Baltic Sea \u2013 Poland and the three newly independent Baltic states \u2013 eventually did. In parliament, Finland\u2019s policy-makers never judged these sovereign decisions by neighbouring states but urged caution against unintended consequences. As renewed tensions with the Russian Federation first with regard to Georgia and since 2014 around Ukraine, consequently also impacting on the Baltic region, have demonstrated, this caution was not farfetched. The Finnish tradition of neutrality and military non-alignment went so far that even Finland\u2019s surprisingly quick integration into the European communities \u2013 Finland acceded to the European Union in 1995 \u2013 was initially marked by concerns of the EU\u2019s relation to military alliances such as the Western European Union and NATO.<\/p>\n<p>While such issues were discussed on the international level, \u00c5land\u2019s demilitarisation and neutralisation \u2013 established in a series of international treaties signed by differing signatories in 1856, 1921, 1940 and 1947 respectively \u2013 gained in relevance for certain actors. While hardly of interest in the 1970s, \u00c5land\u2019s civil society began to take greater notice of this special status in the early 1980s. However, the relevant conventions did not provide the civil authorities of the \u00c5land autonomy with any means to become active in the region\u2019s demilitarisation and neutralisation. Thus, beginning in 1987 they engaged in a notable media campaign whenever Finnish military craft would enter the region. Inspection visits are permitted to a limited extent under the 1921 Convention.<\/p>\n<p>The Finnish government was open to the concerns of \u00c5land\u2019s politicians and Finland\u2019s Ministers of Defence of those years supported the idea of an exchange of information and informal meetings between the \u00c5land autonomy on the one side and the military leadership of the Finnish Defence Forces on the other. The disagreements between the two sides mainly focused on the appropriate interpretation of those parts of the 1921 Convention which dealt with the presence of the Finnish military in the \u00c5land region. The Finnish government did not deem these disagreements to be all too great. In fact, it would have preferred them not to be an issue at all. This preference not to discuss \u00c5land\u2019s status also showed in the accession negotiations to the EU, when references to \u00c5land\u2019s demilitarised and neutralised legal status were only included after strong pressure from the region\u2019s side and supportiveness from the European Commission.<\/p>\n<p>As for the debate within Finland, representatives of the \u00c5land autonomy continued to promote their view of things vis-\u00e0-vis the Finnish government and the Finnish Defence Forces. Regarding the years 1988\u20131995, the verbal conflict arguably peaked around 1992 when high-ranking Finnish military officers argued for a re-examination of \u00c5land\u2019s demilitarised and neutralised status, pointing to thoroughly changed circumstances. This demand, based on the interpretation that the strategic centre of gravity in the Baltic Sea had shifted north due to the fact that \u2013 after the independence of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia \u2013 Russian access to the Baltic Sea was now limited to the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad exclave, even found support among some of their peers in the Swedish military.<\/p>\n<p>However, Finnish ministers and parliamentarians as well as Swedish politicians and the Russian ambassador to Finland were all quick to reject such considerations. Here a \u2018limited internationalisation\u2019 of the debate may be identified: foreign actors intervened in the discussion but did so only in support of positions already present in the Finnish domestic debate. Due to the complete lack of relevant political support, it seems safe to state that a re-examination of the international conventions on \u00c5land and the status they established was never a realistic possibility. After all it was only supported by military officers and some individual military-friendly politicians but by no government or any parliament at large \u2013 including those of Finland.<\/p>\n<p>If one dismisses calls for re-examination as a realistic possibility they appear as what they finally were: a verbal \u2018show of force\u2019. During the Cold War but also equally thereafter it was of utmost importance for the Finnish Defence Forces to demonstrate their capability and determination to defend \u00c5land\u2019s demilitarisation, to fulfil their treaty obligations but of course also to protect Finland\u2019s state sovereignty. Seen in this way, the controversy between \u00c5land\u2019s autonomy and Finland\u2019s military appears less like a dispute over ends than rather like one over means: \u00c5land\u2019s authorities argued the best way to defend \u00c5land was to defend its demilitarisation and neutralisation. The leaders of the Finnish Defence Forces, having a \u2018traditional\u2019 understanding of security shaped by the experiences of both the Winter War and Continuation War, argued that the best way to defend \u00c5land was to maintain readiness to do so militarily.<\/p>\n<p>Although \u00c5land\u2019s authorities and the Finnish military continued to disagree on various details, one fact stood out by 1995: against de iure provisions, the \u00c5land region had established itself as a de facto actor in the discussion of its international status, which \u2013 as is widely agreed \u2013 emerged strengthened. This success was most likely facilitated by the discrepancy in the approaches exercised by the Finnish government and the Finnish Defence Forces: while the government tried to mediate and appease, actually preferring the issue not to be an issue at all, \u00c5land\u2019s authorities continuously felt provoked by Finnish military crafts in their archipelago and were thus unwilling to let the issue rest.<\/p>\n<p>Shifts in the Baltic Sea region had somewhat consolidated by the late 1990s and so did the debate on \u00c5land. Stability was ensured, or so it seemed. As for present tensions in the Baltic Sea it remains to be seen how they and their possible impact on \u00c5land\u2019s international legal status is going to manifest in the future. Regardless of where a possible renewed discussion of \u00c5land\u2019s status might lead, the autonomous region can rely on the ever firmer establishment of this very status within customary international law and is likely to keep a close eye on it.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Further reading:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>S. Eriksson \u2018\u00c5land. A Demilitarised and Neutralised Territory\u2019, in S. Eriksson, L. I. Johansson and B. Sundback (eds.), Islands of Peace. \u00c5land\u2019s autonomy, demilitarisation and neutralisation (\u00c5land Islands Peace Institute, Mariehamn, 2006) pp. 9\u201335.<\/p>\n<p>L. Hannikainen, \u2018The Continued Validity of the Demilitarised and Neutralised Status of the \u00c5land Islands\u2019, 54 Zeitschrift f\u00fcr ausl\u00e4ndisches \u00f6ffentliches Recht und V\u00f6lkerrecht (1994) p. 614\u2013651.<\/p>\n<p>Sj\u00e4lvstyrelsepolitiska n\u00e4mnden \u2018Yttrande\u2019, Nummer 1, 21.05.1993.<\/p>\n<p>\u00c5lands landskapsstyrelse \u2018Redog\u00f6relse enligt \u00a7 32 LO f\u00f6r tiden 1.11.1991\u201331.10.1992\u2019, Nummer 179 Kal, 16.02.1993.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u00a0 Yannick Poullie is a junior researcher in the research project \u201dDemilitarisation in an increasingly militarized world. International perspectives in a multilevel framework \u2013 the case of the \u00c5land Islands\u201d, funded by the KONE foundation. He holds a master\u2019s degree in \u201cPeace, Mediation and Conflict Research\u201d from the University of Tampere, Finland. Prior to that he studied at the University of D\u00fcsseldorf and the University of Turku, respectively. Mariehamn, December 2015 Today, \u00c5land\u2019s status as a demilitarised and neutralised territory is well-established in international customary law. One important contributing factor for that is the activity of the people and politicians of \u00c5land beginning in the 1980s. Against de iure provisions, the \u00c5land autonomy managed to establish itself as an internationally relevant de facto actor on the issue of its international legal status. Finnish policy-makers were not vocal \u2013 as they would have preferred to avoid both the issue and its discussion \u2013 but unmistakable in their support for the maintenance of \u00c5land\u2019s status, as were those of Finland\u2019s neighbours. In light of this fact, preferences by the Finnish military to re-examine this status and possibly remilitarise the \u00c5land region need to be seen as a verbal \u2018show of force\u2019 amidst [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":18800,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18835","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18835","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18835"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18835\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/18800"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18835"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=18835"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peace.ax\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=18835"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}