REPORT FROM THE ÅLAND ISLANDS PEACE INSTITUTE

Rapport från Ålands fredsinstitut

Gibraltar, Jerusalem, Kaliningrad: Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity

Christopher S. Browning & Pertti Joenniemi



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PB 85, AX-22101 Mariehamn, Åland, Finland
Phone +358 18 15570, fax +358 18 21026
peace@peace.ax www.peace.ax

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Preface

Peripherality, marginality, hybridity are all familiar concepts for the Åland Islands, six thousand islands scattered between Finland and Sweden with a population of 27,000 persons and a demilitarized, neutralized and autonomous status. The Åland Islands are small and unimportant with regard to size and population but in a strategic position between east and west, north and south in the Baltic Sea and a symbolic status as the embodiment of a peaceful solution of a dispute by the international community and thanks to the commitment of all parties concerned.

The Åland islands are Finnish and Swedish at the same time and in different ways. It is therefore with great pleasure that the very first of the new series of reports published by the Åland Islands Peace Institute deals with the strategies, perceptions about and self-perceptions of three different regions living at the same time at the center and in the periphery: Gibraltar, Jerusalem and Kaliningrad.

The authors of the present report, Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, argue that choosing a hybridity approach indicates a space for compromise and opens up for possible dialogue. They offer thus a theoretical argument based on empirical evidence about avenues for solving territorial disputes, something that is fully in line with the priorities of the Åland Islands Peace Institute. We are all the more happy to have the first report in the series (co-)written by Pertti Joenniemi, currently Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, who was a member of the Research Board of the Åland Islands Peace Institute from the beginning of its activities and for very many years. Pertti Joenniemi contributed vastly to the construction of the research profile of the Åland Islands Peace Institute.

The reports from the Åland Islands Peace Institute will disseminate new knowledge in the fields of peace and security, autonomy arrangements and minority protection. It is my hope that they will offer new and valuable knowledge in these fields.

Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark
Director, The Åland Islands Peace Institute

Contents

Introduction 5

Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity 6

Gibraltar 9

Kaliningrad 11

Jerusalem 14

Conclusion 16

References 17

Notes 19

Christopher Browning is Assistant Professor in International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK. His research interests are in critical approaches to security and the role of margins in international relations. His recent publications include *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Finland* (Peter Lang, forthcoming), and *Beyond East-West: Marginality and National Dignity in Finnish Identity Construction*, Nationalities Papers 35(4) 2007, pp. 691-716. (With Marko Lehti).

Pertti Joenniemi is Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) in Copenhagen. His latest publications include *The Changing Face of European Conscription* (ed.), Ashgate 2006, and *Wider Europe. Nordic and Baltic Lessons to Post-Enlargement Europe* (edited together with Fabrizio Tassinari and Uffe Jakobsen), DIIS 2006.

Introduction

The radical changes sweeping through the international arena during recent years have shattered many of the time-worn points and conceptualisations of international affairs. Under these circumstances, discourses like those pertaining to integration, centrality and distance are now being read in terms of connectedness. Likewise, the conceptualisation of a unipolar world seems to have opened up the space of international relations for re-evaluation and new thinking. And while some forms of agency have proved more durable than others, all have come to look less natural, authoritative and permanent with the on-going re-articulation of political space.

A variety of "odd" cases, previously regarded as marginal, seem to have benefited from the recent changes and the increased plurality of players in the sphere of international affairs. At one time, borderlines and territorial delineations were strict: the modern era favoured distinct hierarchies and clear, statist configurations. The mainstream discourses delimiting what can and cannot be said in the context of international relations implies that "oddity" acquired a negative reading. As it was thought to infringe the established order, the cases in question were usually silenced and pushed out of sight.

This appears, however, to have changed more recently and in this paper we therefore probe how meaning is assigned to marginality in the various contests over Gibraltar, Jerusalem and Kaliningrad. Our aim is to explore how these three interstices – each of which blurs spatially and conceptually established borders and borderlines – are located in spatio-temporal terms, as well as highlighting the different logics applied in articulating what is at stake and in the search for possible solutions. Are they merely viewed as anomalies to be incorporated into a broader and basically homogeneous political landscape or, in contrast, acknowledged as epitomizing, not just something exceptional, but also incoming and representative of alternative ways of viewing political space?

The three sites are quite topical and over recent years have been the focus of much debate.[1] They are exceptional, as demonstrated by the Spanish sanctions directed against Gibraltar (despite its status as an EU Territory), the Facilitated Transit Document negotiated and agreed between the EU and Russia in the case of Kaliningrad, or the security fence/wall being erected in parts of Jerusalem. Gibraltar and Kaliningrad are clearly contested extra-territorial zones, whilst both are also "spaces of legal exception" (Kaliningrad as a Special Economic Zone and Gibraltar in the form of a tax haven outside the EU's Customs Union and therefore exempted from various EU-practices and policies[2]). Jerusalem, in turn, has world-wide symbolic connotations but lies also at the heart of the Arab-Israeli sovereignty-related conflict.

What unifies the three sites is that they question the traditional Westphalian model of the homogeneous nation-state with continuous clear-cut borders. They are in some sense sites in-between where sovereignty is in question. Power and space intersect in these cases in special ways and in that regard the three cases resemble each other, even if they are not necessarily located within the same discursive fields. For example, Gibraltar is not simply the internal affair of one state, or even simply a matter of relations between two states, but increasingly has become a matter infringing on intra-EU relations in being a contested case between Spain and the UK. Solutions are thus to be searched for by applying the logic governing relations within the EU, with the logic of integration then inviting for a multilevel geometry rather than a purely sovereignty driven frame. For its part Kaliningrad exists as a both-and case: being at the crossroads between Russia and the EU, and in-

fluenced by both of them. As a result of the 2004 enlargement it is partly on the EU inside as a "little Russia" surrounded by EU-member states, and partly outside, being as it is an integral part of Russia, a non-member and a country void of membership prospects. Jerusalem, in turn, is a bone of contention between two rather unequal parties, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Being a divided city, it stands out as a key issue in the discussions sketching various possible solutions to the conflict.

Importantly, though, all three escape to some extent clear-cut dualisms in being neither completely inside, nor completely outside. Thus, what unifies all the three cases is that they problematise clarity as to the unfolding of political space.

Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity

In order to highlight the different discursive frames through which these margins are perceived and approached we distinguish between three concepts: peripherality, marginality and hybridity. What these concepts refer to are the different ways in which people within the margin in question, but also in the core states to which they are marginal, view the nature of those entities or try to deal with the particular issues which they raise. Before focusing on the individual cases we will therefore say a few words about each of the concepts.

The first two concepts of peripherality and marginality might be taken together, as in some respects they both derive from understandings of political space located in a modernist view of the world.

In a modernist understanding of the world space is understood to be divided into neatly defined territorial units, as can be seen on a political map of the world with its multicoloured patchwork patterning of states enjoying absolute sovereignty over clearly defined territorial spaces. Within this view the boundaries between where one territory/state ends and that of another begins are therefore clearly defined. Moreover, in modernism, the sovereign state is rendered distinct from the international system and seen as the highest political authority within a polity composed of a multitude of other agents.

Within such a state-based system borders clearly demarcate what belongs to the inside and what is part of the outside, and little if any tolerance is shown towards overlapping spaces. The prospects for the existence of identities and subjectivities located on the margins and detached from the states – i.e. not fully included conceptually or territorially in the configuration provided for by modernist thinking – are rather constrained. This is not surprising given that sovereignty, as a core concept of world politics, is dependent on mutual recognition, and to gain that states need to demonstrate that they are capable of exercising authority over state affairs, including territorial control. The stance thus appears to go against both-and type solutions, not to speak of "third" spaces located beyond the ordinary constitutive departures. Control over undivided territory appears to be a central criteria of judgement concerning sovereignty, and there is hence a certain orthodoxy in-baked into the prevailing approaches to thinking about and conceptualising world politics and political space (Storey, 2001; Delany, 2005).

On the political map of the world, therefore, a state's, power is seen to flow out evenly across its whole territory. There can be no mixing of colours or blurring of borders between states by the creation of overlapping spaces (Ruggie, 1998, pp. 139-74). In this respect, the idea that margins such as Gibraltar or Kaliningrad lie at the edge of states is particularly pertinent, for the

metaphor of the "edge" conjures up absolute finality, difference and a break with what lies beyond, where "us" and "them" are clearly distinct from each other (cf. Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, pp. 80-99). In short, therefore, modernism is the view that the world is divided into clearly defined territorial spaces and where issues of governance and authority, as much as possible, should run parallel to those borders of sovereign territorial jurisdiction.

In this respect, we suggest the concepts of peripherality and marginality represent alternative strategies of conceptualising and then dealing with the margins of a state's territory, or the margins of modernist territorial politics in general. Peripherality, we suggest, represents a rather complacent perspective of margins, where particular margins are not seen as problematic or as especially challenging to the modernist order. Instead, they are seen, both within the margin and by the core state to which they are marginal, as firmly subordinate to the interests, authority and governance of the sovereign state of which they are a part (Parker, 2000, p. 7). Indeed, to the extent that such a relationship develops it may no longer even be relevant to speak of the margin as a distinct entity with subjectivity as such; it will simply have been absorbed into the whole as the "problem" of the margin as an exception to a modernist conception of territorial politics will have been solved. Peripherality therefore implies a view that the margin in question is inconsequential and subordinate to the centre and the standard logic underpinning the devising of political space, with this in turn indicating considerable disenfranchisement and a lack of independent power and voice for the margin (Browning & Joenniemi, 2004, p. 702).

In contrast, the concept of marginality reflects an understanding of the constitutive role of the margin and the need to constantly reaffirm the modern world. From this perspective deviant cases and odd, contested or self-assertive spaces at the margins are viewed as problematic and as needing to be disciplined in favour of the reassertion of modernist homogeneity. Ambiguity is to be eradicated with the imposition of the control of the centre in the form of the sovereign state. Deviant cases are viewed as threatening due to their ability to transcend established borders (territorially and conceptually), and thereby to destabilise prevailing identities and hierarchies. The prevalent reading concerning such cases is thus that they represent a danger, a loss and/or degeneration towards increased ambiguity and uncontrollability.

However, even from this perspective the existence of such spaces can be given a more positive reading, whereby through the challenge of "sorting them out", such anomalies may in fact contribute to reasserting a modernist vision of political space. That is to say, in tackling the anomaly and disciplining it sovereignty is allowed to come out on top once more, even in complex situations that by their very nature challenge sovereignty and unambiguous, clear and simple forms of territorial control. They are thus not thought about as sites displacing the dominant categories and contaminating their "naturalness" and "purity", but as deviational resources waiting to be sorted out and in turn allowing the modernist project to show its strength in re-producing certainty and predictability.

Finally, in this context, it is important to note that a strategy or preference for modernist marginality may again come from both within the margin itself, or from the centre. For example, margins may perceive considerable benefits in reasserting their position on the edge in modernist terms. This can be seen in how margins (and marginal states) often depict themselves as defensive outposts facing the threatening other, or as being the first line of defence (Browning and Joenniemi 2004, p. 707).

Quite different to the concepts of peripherality and marginality is that of hybridity. Here the

difference and ambiguity of the margin is not seen as threatening and something to be sorted out in the process of re-establishing a modernist order of clear cut distinctions between inside and outside. Instead, ambiguity and the blurring between inside and outside is to be embraced as a resource and where the margin is allowed to speak with its own voice. In this respect we suggest that emphasising hybridity – for example, in terms of the creolisation of the margin's culture in relation to both the inside and outside – might be seen as an alternative way of claiming subjectivity out of marginality. Alternatively, in the following analysis we will also suggest that at times it might even be the core that sees benefits in promoting a margin as a space of hybridity as a way of promoting innovation and the development of an alternative politics, a strategy that may be particularly attractive in an era of globalisation. In contrast, this may even be something the margin itself rejects, preferring instead more modernist frameworks for constructing identity.

As a concept hybridity therefore indicates that the "sovereignty game" might be becoming more flexible with post-modernisation and globalisation allowing for a solution of territorial issues over sovereignty and identity. For example, Diez (2002) notes how the European Union protects and recognises minorities and regions as political subjects within the acquis. Arguably, therefore, territory is starting to lose some of its significance with the EU emerging as an actor that defies notions of boundedness and the categorical centrality of the state. Among other things, within the EU borders are becoming less distinct (this allowing for far more flexible solutions), while also being subverted by increasing cross-border flows. Consequently, the stronger standing of the less sovereignty-geared EU-logic has prompted scholars – like Diez – to be reasonably optimistic about the options for conflict settlement in tricky cases such as that of Cyprus. The contention is that the same may also be the case with Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem.

The point is that a hybridity perspective implies it might be possible to locate cases like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem quite differently. In particular, they do not have to be viewed as merely national issues located in the sphere of inter-state relations, but may also be related to other and broader constellations. Rather than being viewed as issues to be sorted out between the neighbouring states, they may gain legitimacy as political spaces that are part of emerging, more differentiated constellations (like the EU). With traditional notions of sovereignty becoming relativised as a result of globalisation processes, new options and solutions might come into sight. This is not least because globalisation, in being propelled by dynamics of its own, may be assumed to despatialize and detemporalize various objects of enquiry.

Although on the one hand a hybridity approach might be seen as implying a loss of standing for states, on the other, therefore, it also indicates that space for compromise might be found between states regarding conflicts over margins like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem. Indeed, approving of and contributing to flexible solutions in respect to such spaces might be a way in which states can demonstrate they are in tune with globalisation. In the following we therefore provide a broad overview of the different ways in which the cases of Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem have been framed and perceived by relevant actors in each case. To what extent, in other words, can one identify discourses in which these margins/odd spaces are perceived through the frames of peripherality, marginality and hybridity?

Gibraltar

Gibraltar has been a thorn in the side of UK-Spanish relations ever since it was ceded from Spain to the UK via the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. More particularly, it has become a problem of territorial sovereignty, with Spain claiming territorial rights over Gibraltar, with the UK traditionally defending their ownership of "the Rock", and with the Gibraltarians stuck somewhere in between. The aim, here, however, is not to explore the relative merits of the competing sovereignty claims over Gibraltar, or to show how the issue has fluctuated through history. Instead, it is to outline how Gibraltar is perceived in the discourses of the relevant actors, Spain, the UK, and Gibraltar.

One thing very clear about Gibraltar is that it is not viewed by any side in terms of peripherality. The status and ownership of Gibraltar has been a recurring matter of dispute for centuries and remains so. To the extent that modernist understandings of political space have dominated, then contesting claims have turned Gibraltar into a conceptual problem. This failure to "sort Gibraltar out" according to modernist premises, and the perception of this as a problem in itself, was made notably clear by Peter Hain, then the UK's Minister for Europe, in 2002 when speaking in the House of Commons. As he put it: "the status quo is not sustainable, because Gibraltar's relations with Spain are abnormal and will remain so if the status quo prevails".[3] In other words, there is a need to "fix" Gibraltar in line with working on the sovereignty issue.

In Gibraltar such comments have traditionally fueled suspicions that the British government is willing to do a deal with the Spanish government over their heads, with the view being that ultimately the UK is willing to hand over this "anomaly" to Spain. In recent years such concerns were enhanced by the fact that in July 2001 the UK Foreign Office, under Foreign Minister Jack Straw, recommenced the 1984 Brussels Process of talks with Spain over the future of Gibraltar. Notably the talks were initially kept secret with the Government of Gibraltar excluded. Indeed, when they were finally informed of the ongoing talks the Gibraltarians were only offered the right to sit in on the talks, but not as an equal third party. Denied equal subjectivity alongside the state entities they refused.

The fact that Spain views the issue in either-or modernist terms and perceives Gibraltar as a problematic space that needs to be sorted out in line with the doctrine of sovereignty has always been clear. Spain's bottom line is that Gibraltar needs to return to full Spanish sovereignty. In this respect, it is notable that the Spanish government has consistently refused to think of Gibraltar in any sense as an overlapping space that may be amenable for more postmodern solutions. For example, Spain has long imposed sanctions on Gibraltar and has instituted one of the toughest border crossing points in the EU to make its point that this is not an issue for thinking about sharing territory or for thinking of more innovative solutions.[4] Indeed, in some respects Spain even tries to deny the very existence of Gibraltar, in that Spain's new coastal road lacks a single road sign to Gibraltar, even though it passes just by the Rock (International Herald Tribune 19/12/2005). Also notable is how Spain has frequently declared Gibraltar as a site of organized crime, smuggling and money laundering precisely as a way to enhance its claim to sovereignty over the peninsula. The implication is that by bringing the Rock under the full territorial jurisdiction of Spain law and order (but also territorial Westphalian ordering) will be restored.[5] In other words, Gibraltar's undecided status is presented as a negativity in being able to escape some of the control of the statist centre – with standardization then offered as the recipe for improvements to come about and a more orderly life to be achieved.

However, whilst modernist perspectives of marginality emphasising the need to sort out Gibraltar in terms of sovereign visions of spatial ordering remain prominent, more innovative ideas can also be identified that to some degree support ideas of conceptualizing Gibraltar as a space of hybridity and that see such hybridity as a resource, rather than something to be disciplined.

On the one hand, it should be noted that although the British government has been concerned about the "abnormality" of Gibraltar, the UK's proposed solution is not a traditional Westphalian one of sovereignty transfer (the Spanish preference), but has involved discussions on joint sovereignty with Spain. This has been proposed as a permanent solution, not a stepping stone to full Spanish sovereignty, and includes ideas of Gibraltarians holding dual British/Spanish nationality and a largely devolved government to Gibraltar. Of course, even this proposal remains stuck in the discourse of sovereignty and since sovereignty is an all or nothing category it is unclear that joint or shared sovereignty makes much sense as a concept. It does, however, represent a move to more innovative thinking.[6] Indeed, Gibraltar's current position partly inside the EU in territorial terms, but partly outside, in terms of things like the Customs Union and the CAP, is already indicative of more flexible approaches to territoriality and governance operating in the EU.

For their part, the "abnormality" in need of resolution seen by the British government is viewed differently by most Gibraltarians, who on the whole do not see their situation as one of abnormality requiring solutions, especially sovereignty directed solutions. For their part they are rather happy with the status quo, being formally under British sovereign rule, but with a significant degree of autonomy. Discussion of "joint sovereignty" between the UK and Spain has particularly rankled and they have been keen to assert the view that under modern international law "The people of Gibraltar, like all colonial peoples before them, enjoy the inalienable right to self-determination, that is, the right to determine their own future".[7] This view was upheld in an unofficial referendum held in November 2002 which unanimously rejected the idea of joint sovereignty.

Similarly, it might also be noted that Spain's imposition of a strict border regime and its generally disruptive policies towards the territory have also contributed to promoting a distinctive Gibraltarian identity built to a considerable degree around anti-Spanish themes and that in turn has fostered a strong attachment to Britain. Indeed, it has also been argued that a distinct Gibraltarian identity only really emerged with Spain's harsh sanctions against the entity, with this more than anything promoting notions of Gibraltar as a British territory and further helping frame the construction of Gibraltarian identity in terms of sovereignty (Holtom, 2002, p. 236; Jackson, 1987, p. 319). In this respect, if the UK government worries about the abnormality of Gibraltar, Gibraltarians rather worry that normalisation of relations between Spain and Gibraltar might actually undermine its authenticity – nurtured not least by forced isolation. In particular, they worry that Spanish sovereignty would result in the death of Gibraltar as a distinct cultural space.

However, at the same time, Gibraltarians know that autarky is not an option. Instead, there is a desire to gain full access to the European market which therefore does mean finding some kind of accommodation with Spain. Thus, also on the Gibraltarians' side there is a need to escape the confines of a solely sovereignty-driven discourse and to some extent play up the resources seen to derive from an identity of hybridity. This however, is not straightforward. As noted, to the extent that Spain pressures Gibraltar and adopts aggressive tactics of trying to gain sovereignty

over the Rock then this seems to have the effect of enhancing Gibraltarians notions of themselves as archetypal Brits; hence to some extent resisting any efforts of installing any hybrid in-between or third space type of identities.

However, it is important that Gibraltarians are also keen to highlight their distinctiveness (their hybridity) from the British "mainstream". Thus, despite concerns about Spanish intentions, an embracing of British-Spanish hybridity is also evident in the culture as Victorian cast-iron balconies, iconic British phone booths and mail-boxes, pubs and Sunday lunches are mixed with Spanish cuisine and a linguistic "Spanglish" (see International Herald Tribune 19/12/2005). Similarly, and in contradistinction from the British mainstream, Gibraltarians also tend to be very pro-European. In some ways this has been a tactic of distancing them from the Spanish, but it also challenges notions of Britishness constructed in opposition to Europe and where the EU is seen as a defence against Britain trampling on Gibraltarians' EU rights (Muller, 2004 p. 44). That the EU itself has so far been unwilling to embrace this hybridity in Gibraltar or to become actively engaged in resolving the dispute is therefore somewhat surprising.

Although this hybridity perspective remains in the background it is perhaps also worth noting that even on the Spanish side possibilities for viewing the distinctiveness of Gibraltar and avoiding sovereignty-driven discourses are also evident. These, however, do not come from the central government, but from within the Spanish region of Campo that borders onto Gibraltar and which does not always adhere to the Spanish government's position. Instead, this Spanish margin has perceived advantages in terms of trade and tourism in working with a more open border with Gibraltar, with mayors of towns and villages in the Campo continuing sincere attempts to develop joint projects in spite of opposition in Madrid (Holtom, 2002, p. 237).

In the case of Gibraltar, therefore, sovereignty-geared frames have been notable. For the most part the perspective has been one of marginality, with a desire to "fix" and "order" the Gibraltarian "anomaly" in line with modernist conceptions of space. This has been clearest on the Spanish side, but has also been evident in the UK and even in Gibraltar, where identity has often been built precisely by asserting the otherness of Spain. However, Gibraltar only appears an anomaly to the extent that it is perceived through modernist lenses. Shifting the frame means that Gibraltar is no longer a space to be disciplined and brought into line. Indeed, the option of normalising its hybridity as a space-between is there and may entail considerable resources, especially if this hybridity is constituted in terms of a mixing of British, Spanish and EU elements.

Kaliningrad

In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement of the EU Russia's Kaliningrad oblast located between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea coast began to assume an important place on the agenda of EU-Russian relations. The problem was that as a region geographically separated from the rest of Russia Kaliningrad was set to become surrounded by new EU member states that, as a part of the accession preconditions, would be required to impose the EU's stringent border regimes and controls, as well as other regulations associated with the acquis. Concern that Kaliningrad may find itself isolated behind new trade regulations and the imposition of the Schengen visa regime has been palpable, with many worrying that Kaliningrad would ultimately slide into a cycle of instability and impoverishment.[8]

Since the end of the 1990s this has resulted in considerable debate about the status of Kalinin-

grad and how developments there may impact on the state of EU-Russian relations. However, the problem has not only been one of the character of EU-Russian relations, but also of the very constitution of EU and Russian subjectivity. This is to say that the Kaliningrad issue has become one that significantly problematises how the EU and Russia understand political space and borders of inside/outside in Europe.

On the part of Moscow and Kaliningrad the general tendency has been to approach the issue through modernist perspectives. On the one hand, Kaliningrad has clearly been viewed through frames of peripherality, in the sense that Kaliningrad has often been denied its own unique status, instead being seen as simply a central constitutive element of Russian territory. However, for the most part marginality frames have dominated with Kaliningrad's exclave status becoming a reason for the active reassertion of modernist orderings of political space. For instance, throughout much of the 1990s the idea of Kaliningrad as a military outpost of Russia remained important. Not least this has been the case in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has meant that Kaliningrad is now all that remains of the territories to which Russia expanded during the Great Patriotic War (Wellmann, 1996, p. 172). This symbolic link between great Russia and Kaliningrad has become stronger with the shrinking of Russia's sphere of influence (Janusauskas, 2001, p. 236), whilst this way of relating to the past tends to reproduce binary thinking regarding whether space should be seen as ours or theirs. Throughout much of the 1990s the result was that many in Kaliningrad and Moscow became suspicious of any talk of opening up Kaliningrad to the external environment, since this was seen as endangering Russia's geographical and political integrity (Joenniemi, 1996, pp. 95-96).

These concerns, for example, have made both Kaliningraders and Moscow highly sensitive to claims of German, Polish and Lithuanian nationalists who have occasionally claimed territorial rights to Kaliningrad. Indeed, in the 1990s such concerns even resulted in the authorities being highly suspicious of foreign (especially German) investment in the territory, particularly when this might involve land purchases (Oldberg, 2000, p. 279). However, although the emphasis on Kaliningrad as a military outpost has generally reflected defensive concerns of preserving Russia's territorial sovereignty over Kaliningrad, it has also had a more proactive element to it, with some Russians clearly seeing Kaliningrad's unique position as a resource to reassert Russia's geopolitical presence in the Baltic region. This was particularly the case in light of debates about NATO enlargement to the Baltic States and where Russia explicitly used strategies of securitising and militarising Kaliningrad as a way to try and derail the enlargement process. This was evident, for example, in 2002, just before the decision on NATO enlargement to the Baltic States was made, when Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad and asserted that NATO enlargement might destabilise the region. Furthermore, he proclaimed that Moscow was committed to defending Kaliningrad from external attacks, for which new ships were being provided to keep the Kaliningrad fleet battle ready (Felgenhauer, 2002).

For its part the EU has also remained stuck in a rather traditional bordering discourse that has focused on the EU's external border with Kaliningrad as a security border and a border of control and exclusion clearly demarcating our space from theirs (Browning, 2003). The EU, for example, has generally viewed Kaliningrad as a source of soft security threats to the EU, with the EU typically characterising Kaliningrad as an almost anarchic zone or developmental sink hole that threatens the EU with smuggling operations, economic instability and public health

concerns. In this respect, Kaliningrad has figured as an entity to be firmly differentiated and isolated from European space. This also explains why the EU has remained adamant that the Schengen visa regime be applied to Kaliningrad.

The Schengen issue has been important in that as Russia has pointed out it implies that for Russians to travel to or from Kaliningrad by land they would now need a visa, which in principle could be denied by an EU visa official, thereby indicating a situation in which a foreign official might be able to prevent a Russian travelling between two parts of their own country. Meanwhile, for Kaliningraders the whole visa regime has threatened to disrupt local trade patterns with Lithuania and Poland and has threatened to become a significant obstacle to economic development.

However, despite this emphasis on rather modernist understandings of sovereignty, it is also possible to identify alternative approaches, which have entailed a certain openness to the idea of Kaliningrad as a hybrid space. For example, alongside the sovereignty driven frames of peripherality and marginality, in the late 1990s and early 2000s ideas that Kaliningrad could be used as a test case of EU-Russia relations were also being aired. The core idea here has been that Kaliningrad might be conceived of as an experimental "third space" partly integrated into EU practices whilst remaining a sovereign territory of Russia. Such ideas have been a direct response to Kaliningrad's isolation from the developing Common Market and the need to avoid EU enlargement further impoverishing the entity as a result of its neighbours being required to comply with EU standards and border policies.

In this respect the idea that Kaliningrad could become an economic pioneer, a "New Hansa", "pilot region", "bridge", "meeting place", "test case" for the future of European governance and a "cradle for Russia's internationalisation" has been commonly mooted (Browning and Joenniemi, 2004, p. 719). For example, parallels have been drawn between Kaliningrad and Hong Kong, the idea being that, like Hong Kong, Kaliningrad could be an innovative space and "five star hotel" where one country experiments with two systems (Khlopetsky, 2001, p. 55; Oldberg, 1998, p. 9). Along these lines, it has been argued by some Kaliningrad politicians that Kaliningrad should be granted an autonomous status enabling it to join the EU economic area without ceding from Russia (Oldberg, 2002, p. 67), whilst in a similar context the region has now become integrated into three of the EU's Euroregions (Baltica, Niemen and Saule) thereby to some extent blurring the inside/outside nature of the EU's external border.[9]

As in Gibraltar these ideas have also been accompanied by a growing identification of Kaliningrad with a hybrid and mixed culture. For example, after the Soviet Union appropriated Kaliningrad into Russia following World War II Stalin instigated a systematic program of de-Germanisation. This entailed the renaming of towns and cities (e.g. Königsberg became Kaliningrad) and geographical features. It included the forced deportation of the surviving German inhabitants and their replacement with Soviet citizens. It included the Sovietisation of Kaliningrad's architecture, with old Prussian buildings being torn down and replaced with the ubiquitous Soviet-style bloc buildings. And it even included Kaliningrad's twisting medieval cobblestone streets being straightened into wide asphalt-covered Soviet avenues. Today, however, there is greater willingness to emphasise the region's mixed cultural heritage. This has become clearest in the return of Prussian/German architectural styles and a growing interest in the diverse history of the region under Lithuanian, Polish, German, Soviet, and most recently Russian rule (Browning and Joenniemi, 2004, pp. 719-21; Sezneva, 2002).

In other words, therefore, elements of Kaliningrad's multiple heritages are being raised, but which in this case seem to provide space for conceptualising Kaliningrad as transcending Russian/European divides, whereby Kaliningrad is neither fully inside or outside either space. This shift towards a hybridity perspective is far from comprehensive and faces opposition within Kaliningrad, but also in the EU and Moscow. In Moscow, for example, Kaliningraders' desires to develop their region into a linking space with the rest of Europe are easily represented as secessionist and as aimed at undermining Russia's territorial integrity. Moscow's fears of rampant regionalisation (particularly during the Yeltsin years) are well documented, and are not least manifest in Putin's centralising reforms of 2000 and which has seen regions like Kaliningrad being subordinated to newly Kremlin-appointed federal governors. For its part the EU has worried about being seen to be interfering in Russia's internal politics and has therefore been wary of opening up to Kaliningrad too much, whilst opening up it is also feared may give Russia another lever into the EU's own internal politics.

Jerusalem

In the case of Jerusalem the more recent history of the city appears to testify to a change from peripherality to centrality and the strengthening of a statist logic. However, Jerusalem's symbolic connotations also continue to impact the unfolding of political space.

Notably, prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jerusalem had not played any major role in the struggle for territorial control between the respective parties. The city was undoubtedly perceived as being historically and symbolically significant, but it was not a centre of political and economic activity. This role was – even according to the Zionist leadership – reserved for Tel Aviv, located in the coastal plain, the first "Hebrew, city of the nationalist movement and centre of activity during the pre-State years."[10] Considerable flexibility prevailed even with attention gradually geared towards Jerusalem. The Jewish Agency tabled a partition plan in 1937 based on the prospects of open boundaries and free movement between the two parts of the city. With the British Mandate of Palestine expiring, the United Nations recommended in 1947 "the creation of a special international regime in the City of Jerusalem, i.e. the ordinary statist logic should not be extended to cover Jerusalem. This plan, however, did not materialise and at the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Jerusalem – then still a single city part of the British Mandate and in that sense part of a non-statist logic – became divided between Israel and Jordan. The next year Israel designated West Jerusalem as its capital whereas Jordan held and eventually annexed East Jerusalem, including the Old City. In 1988 Jordan decided to "disengage" from the West Bank and threw its support behinds the claims of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the latter proclaimed statehood throughout the Occupied Territories and identified Jerusalem as the capital of this prospective entity.

Openness continued to be the constitutive argument in the Israeli discourse with complaints about Jordan blocking access to holy places and cultural institutions in the eastern city, above all to Mount Scopus and the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. The arguments were then used to wage war and legitimize a unilateral annexation of the eastern parts of the city in 1967. The claim was that Israel would respect, unlike Jordan, all religious beliefs and allow free access to all holy sites under its sovereignty. A statist overtaking was there in order to protect the basically non-statist nature of the city. It was felt to be particularly important to do away with the

boundary that had separated the eastern and western parts of the city from each other. In other words, the argument was for the creation of an open and unrestricted space, but not at the expense of statist logic. The claim was that Jerusalem had now been turned into a multi-religious city, a place of harmony where Jews, Muslims and Christians could live peacefully side by side, although qualified by a rather modern logic in the sense that no other national identity other than that of "Israeli" was acknowledged and the city was to remain undivided also in the sense of not turning into a single city hosting two different capitals. Interestingly, therefore, the argument of openness was also one of exclusion in that it acted to try and prevent a potential competing statist configuration from emerging (Klein, 2004, p. 2).

Consequently, rather than bridging and building on hybridity Israel has over time been engaged in constructing barriers, fences and walls. Overall, Jerusalem has grown into a quite complicated and concentric configuration based on segregation, compartmentalization and the creation of enclaves consisting of various ethnic groups and nationalities. The configuration – with security high on the agenda particularly during the years of Intifada – does not merely impact on the city itself but extends in influence to cover the West Bank more generally.

The notion of openness is, in this context, qualified by Israeli sovereignty and applies only within the annexed city itself, in regard to the nearby settlements and in view of the rest of Israel as well as a worldwide Jewish community.[11] The eastern parts have been largely cut off from the surrounding Palestinian areas through various degrees of closure, curfews, roadblocks and other similar measures. They are not to host a competing statist configuration. The "separation barrier" constructed since 2003 between Israel and the West Bank and now largely completed constitutes the most visible and concrete manifestation of the restrictive policies pursued.[12] Whilst the initial claim was one of doing away with various borderlines and restrictions separating the eastern and western parts from each other, in practice various ethnic-national, political, communal, religious, historical and cultural walls have nonetheless restricted exchange to a minimum. A declaratory policy of openness and non-bordering on the statist level has been complemented by a restrictive and exclusive one on the local level. Moreover, since 2000 Israel has also used mobile roadblocks and police checkpoints to create a soft border regime to run along the seam between East and West Jerusalem.

The efforts of control are mainly territorial and relate to Jerusalem's frontier-nature, but also in some respects include symbolic and temporal issues. For example, with the Temple Mount and the Western Wall being important religious sites, questions of sovereignty – in terms of the right to decide upon excavation – have been of considerable importance. The policies pursued in this regard have been restricted and cautious, although at junctures also active and conflictual, with the issues involved amounting at some junctures to proposals in the context of the peace talks such as dividing sovereignty "vertically and horizontally", i.e. the Palestinians would control everything above ground, while Israel would have sovereignty over everything underneath the ground (e.g. Gold, 2001, p. 50).

Interestingly, with closure rather than openness having over time enjoyed the most prominent place on the various party-related agendas relevant for Jerusalem (the international community, not to speak of various religious actors such as the Vatican have largely continued to pursue hybrid approaches), the parties have at least on occasions signalled that they might reconsider their position. The message has been, in the context of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the Camp David summit of July 2000, the presentation of the "Clinton Parameters" in Decem-

ber 2000 and the Taba talks of January 2001, that the boundaries are not holy artefacts, but man-made constructs that may change as part of a negotiated peace. In fact, the various Jerusalem-related issues such as sovereignty and the establishment of a border between the eastern and the western parts of the city along ethnic-national lines turned out to be negotiable. The "Clinton Parameters" were explicitly based on the rather modern idea that Jerusalem should encompass the internationally recognized capitals of two states, Israel and Palestine, and what is Arab should be Palestinian and what is Jewish should be Israeli.[13] The aim was, in other words, to depart basically from space being divided rather unambiguously and then sort out the remaining issues in a rather practical manner. Yet, in addition to full sovereignty the discussions encompassed ideas of functional, shared, residual or postponed sovereignty. However, the airing of a broad variety of ideas and proposals previously "unthinkable" did not amount to results in the sense of a meeting of minds and formal agreement.

Although the various elements are still there, the rift between the parties appears to have grown over time rather than gaps being bridged. With the collapse of the exploratory talks, negotiations over the final status have no longer been on the agenda. Israel concluded, particularly with Ariel Sharon at the helm, that the prospects for negotiated solutions were in general slim. The emphasis moved, instead, to efforts of finding and implementing unilateral solutions such as the withdrawal from Gaza. A similar emphasis on unilateralism has been discernible also for the part of Jerusalem with various measures pursued locally in the form of establishing "facts on ground" that reduce considerably the option of the city hosting simultaneously two capitals, or sovereignty being granted to all the areas with an Arab population. The local policies thus strongly reflect statist endeavours and efforts of strengthening primordial and divisive identities. This seems to be the case both on the Israeli and the Palestinian sides.

The policies of increased stress on fencing and bordering and less emphasis on openness might, as such, yield the political and symbolic constellations of centrality aspired for but the economic and social expenditure for the policies pursued remain considerable. Jerusalem still holds the position of one of the poorer cities in Israel with considerable levels of unemployment and welfare dependency. Notably, Tel Aviv continues to take on the role of social and economic centre of the country and is also the site of almost all of the foreign embassies, with Jerusalem remaining a contested site also from a diplomatic perspective. More generally, the efforts to quell the nature of Jerusalem as a site in-between and to reduce and undermine its heritage as central in religious, symbolic and historical terms in favour of more statist, sovereignty-related centrality appear to be attached to considerable costs, both human and material.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have in this paper tried to show how margins like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem have been approached through different spatial lenses. In each case it has been shown how modernist frames, that either view the margin in terms of peripherality or marginality have been apparent, and even to some extent dominant in political discourse. According to these frames, the marginality of each of these entities is a problem in need of remedial action through which to discipline the margin back in conformity with principles of sovereign territoriality. However, what the analysis has also tried to illustrate is the extent to which such modernist perceptual frames and ways of conceptualising political space and subjectivity

are in themselves constitutive of some of the problems faced at the margins in question.

In contrast, the chapter has also shown how in each case different conceptual possibilities are present whereby modernist frames are occasionally moderated with a perspective that views the margin in terms of hybridity, and where hybridity entails a refusal to think in terms of the neat territorial packages of modernist frames of reference. As an approach we would argue that hybridity retains interesting space for creativity and for conceiving of subjectivity in ways outside of the either-or strictures of sovereignty. In each case it has been shown that recognition of the novelty of playing up an identity of hybridity is to some extent identified, however, such recognition also appears weak. This points to the fact that it is not enough to simply recognise the novelty of hybridity, but that salient parties must also have the competence or interest to hook into it in order to exploit the situation and aspire to break outside the confines of the established political order and the narratives underpinning it. To the extent that they are able to do this then entities like Gibraltar, Kaliningrad and Jerusalem may to some extent gain agency themselves. The reason why this is so is because, as stated at the beginning, unlike modernist perspectives which deprive odd spaces of subjectivity from the very start by dividing them into either-or types of cases and enforce them to become part of a well entrenched binary hierarchy (cf. Norval, 1999, p. 107), hybridity perspectives offer the possibility for more diffused and heterogeneous understandings of subjectivity aside from that of states. Finally, and following Pieterse (2001, p. 221), we would argue that although hybridity is nothing new as such, as a result of processes of globalisation the scope for thinking in terms of hybridity is widening. Indeed, in an era of globalisation understanding the possibilities of playing on hybridity might be understood as a considerable resource.

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Notes

1 The Åland Islands could for good reasons have been included into the study, although we have here aimed at covering a number of more recent and contentious cases. On Åland, see for example Christer Ahlström (1995), Pertti Joenniemi (1997) or Teija Tiilikainen (1999).

2 For example, Gibraltar is also outside the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, Common Fisheries Policy, and the tax system. Karis Muller (2004) "Being 'European' in Gibraltar", *European Integration* 26(1), p. 44.

3 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Gibraltar: Eleventh Report if Session* 2001-02, HC973, 7 November 2002.

4 Sanctions have included restricted use of phone lines, slow border crossings and the fact that planes and boats visiting Gibraltar are not permitted to then stop in Spain.

5 Whether Gibraltar is a site of organized crime in the way Spain claims is a contentious issue and is denied by the Gibraltarians, whilst there have been moves in recent years by the Gibraltarian government to bring the territory in line with EU practices in this regard (Muller, 2004, p. 45).

6 On the British government's proposals see: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Gibraltar: Eleventh Report if Session* 2001-02, HC973, 7 November 2002.

7 Government of Gibraltar quoted in BBC News Online, "Analysis: Gibraltar not done deal yet", 1207/2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2125161.stm. Interestingly, they argue the principle of self-determination needs to be seen as trumping the clause within Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht which states that should Britain ever give up sovereignty of Gibraltar it must be offered back to Spain first. In the British view this has meant there can be no independence for Gibraltar, which also explains Britain's emphasis on joint sovereignty in their proposals.

8 For an overview see Fairlie and Sergounin (2001).

9 For a series of innovative recommendations proposed by both European and Russian scholars see, Birkenbach and Wellmann (2003).

10 See Newman (2002), p. 48.

11 On this latter point, see Newman (2002, 61).

12 For a balanced description of the situation, see the International Crisis Group (2005).

13 For a more detailed description of the proposals as well as the positions of the parties, see for example Gold (2001) and Bell et. al. (2005).

Gibraltar, Jerusalem, Kaliningrad: Peripherality, Marginality, Hybridity
Christopher S. Browning & Pertti Joenniemi

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

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